We present some equivalences between some symmetric dualities in nonlinear programming and some matrix games. We study three pairs of dual problems: Wolfe, Mond-Weir and fractional types. For each pair, the paper presents two different zero-sum games whose Nash equilibria correspond to the solutions of the pair of nonlinear symmetric dual problems. And certain conclusions about symmetric dual fractional programming and its special cases are also treated.
Introduction
Symmetric duality in nonlinear programming was introduced by Dorn [7] and Dorn [7] gave a symmetric dual theorem for quadratic programs while Dantzig et al. [6] and Mond [13] formulated a pair of symmetric dual programs involving a scalar function f (x, y), x ∈ R n , y ∈ R m under the condition that f (·, y) is convex and f (x, ·) is concave. Cottle [4] presented a slightly different pair of symmetric dual quadratic programs. A different pair of symmetric dual nonlinear programs was given by Mond and Weir [14] , which allows the weakening of the convexity hypothesis for f (x, y). Chandra et al. [2] formulated a pair of symmetric dual fractional programming problems under suitable convexity hypothesis.
Recently, Kim et al. [10] presented a pair of symmetric variational problems and very recently Kim and Lee [11, 12] extended symmetric duality theorems for multiobjective variational problems.
In [5] , some equivalence between linear programming duality and a symmetric matrix is given. In the finite dimensional setting, Chandra et al. [1] presented analogues of results from [5] for a certain class of nonlinear programming problems. For the infinite dimensional case, similar results have been obtained by Tijs [16] for semi-infinite programming, and Forgo [8] and Underwood [17] for continuous linear programming. And also Chandra et al. [3] studied continuous linear programs which has been introduced by Bellman and studied by Levinson and Tyndall and continuous matrix game equivalence.
Kemp and Kimura [9] gave an equivalence theorem where the matrix game is not necessarily a symmetric game. In this case the matrix game depends on primal and dual variables. Recently Preda [15] gave analogues of Theorem 17 due to [9] for a certain class of nonlinear programming problems, where matrix games depend only on primal variables. These problems are finite dimensional and satisfy certain generalized convexity requirements.
The main purpose of this paper is to present some equivalences between some symmetric dualities in nonlinear programming and some matrix games. For this intention, the content has been divided into 4 sections. In Section 2 we give some equivalences between the Wolfe type symmetric duality [13] of a nonlinear programming problem and some matrix games and its example. Mond-Weir type symmetric duality [14] is treated in Section 3. In Section 4 we obtain some equivalences between symmetric dual fractional programming [5] and some matrix games. Also we consider a special case of symmetric dual fractional programming [2] .
Wolfe symmetric duality and matrix game
Let us consider the nonlinear symmetric programming problem (WP) together with its Wolfe dual (WD) [13] as follows:
Small letters will denote vectors and capital letters matrices. A T will denote transpose of A. Let R k be a k-dimensional Euclidean space and f (x, y) be a real-valued differentiate function of x and y, where x and y have dimensions n and m, respectively. For each fixed y, f (x, y) is convex in x and for each fixed x, f (x, y) is concave in y in the region defined by the above conditions. And
The following lemma is due to [1] . Now define the following (n + m + 1) × (n + m + 1) skew symmetric matrix:
Note that we can propose a number of different matrices. 
Proof. From the hypotheses of the theorem, we have the following:
x 0,ȳ 0.
Multiplying (3) byx 0 gives −x∇ y f (x,ȳ) Tȳ = 0 and from (2) we obtain
Multiplying (1) 
From (3) we have
But z * > 0 by (4) , and hence, expressing relations (5)- (7) and (4) in terms of x * , y * , we get
From (8)- (10) we have the following form of inequality:
with ξ * = col(x * , y * , z * ), where col denotes column vector. Now (13) together with (11) and (12), is implied by Lemma 2.1 that ξ * is an optimal strategy for player 2 in the matrix game B 1 (x,ȳ). Since B 1 (x,ȳ) is skew symmetric, the value of the matrix game B 1 (x,ȳ) is zero and ξ * is an optimal strategy to player 1 as well. Thus (x * , y * , z * ) solves the matrix game 
Dividing (14)- (16) by z * > 0, we have
From (17) and (18),
Using (22) and (23), we obtain
It implies that
Thus (x,ȳ) is feasible for both (WP) and (WD), and the objective function of (WP) equals the objective function of (WD) at (x,ȳ). This, with weak duality, proves that (x,ȳ) is optimal for both (WP) and (WD). 2
Now we consider the matrix game associated with the following (n + 1) × (m + 1) matrix:
ȳ) is a feasible solution to both (WP) and (WD) with the two objective functions having equal values. If also weak duality holds between (WP) and (WD), then (x,ȳ) is optimal for both problems.
Proof. Because the value of the game (in random extension) is zero and (P 0 , Q 0 ) is an equilibrium point hence we obtain
2 > 0 and therefore from above we obtain
From ( 
Then (P 0 , Q 0 ) solves the matrix game M 1 (x,ȳ) and the value of this game is zero.
Proof. By the hypothesisȳ T ∇ y f (x,ȳ) = 0, we have
By the hypotheses of the theorem, −∇ x f (x,ȳ) 0 and
Hence we have the above inequality.
Sincex Tx + 1 > 0 and ∇ y f (x,ȳ) 0, the above inequality holds. Thus (P 0 , Q 0 ) is an equilibrium point for the matrix game M 1 (x,ȳ) and the value of this game is zero. 2 
For each fixed y, f (x, y) is convex in x and for each fixed x, f (x, y) is concave in y. (x,ȳ) = (11/17, 4/17) is a feasible solution to both (WP) and (WD) with f (x,ȳ)
− y T ∇ y f (x,ȳ) = f (x,ȳ) −x T ∇ x f (x,ȳ) = −13/17. Then B 1 (x,ȳ) =    0 − 44
Mond-Weir symmetric duality and matrix game
Let us consider a different pair of symmetric dual nonlinear programming problems (MWP) together with its Mond-Weir dual (MWD) [14] in which the convexity and concavity assumptions have been reduced to pseudo-convexity and pseudo-concavity, as follows:
Here f is a twice differentiable real-valued function of x and y, where x ∈ R n , y ∈ R m , u ∈ R n and v ∈ R m . Now we can consider the same matrix B 1 (x, y) and M 1 (x, y) in Section 2. Proof. By the conditions of the theorem we have the following:
From the above conditions we get
The above inequalities imply B 1 (x,ȳ)ξ * 0, with ξ * = col(x * , y * , z * ). Hence by Lemma 2.2, ξ * is an optimal strategy for player 2 in the matrix game B 1 (x,ȳ) 1 (x,ȳ) ,
ȳ) is a feasible solution to both (MWP) and (MWD) with the two objective functions having equal values. In addition, if there is weak duality between (MWP) and (MWD) then (x,ȳ) is optimal to both (MWP) and (MWD).
Proof. Let ξ * = col(x * , y * , z * ). Since ξ * solves the game B 1 (x,ȳ) and the matrix is skew symmetric, B 1 (x,ȳ)ξ * 0 by Lemma 2.1. Thus (34)-(38) hold. From (37), (38) we havē x 0,ȳ 0.
Dividing (34) by z * , we get
Hence, since ∇ y f (x,ȳ) 0 andȳ 0,
Dividing (35) by z * gives −x∇ y f (x,ȳ) Tȳ − ∇ x f (x,ȳ) 0. But fromx 0,ȳ 0 and (39), we get
By (40), (42) andx 0, we obtain
(39), (43) andx 0 give the feasibility of (x,ȳ) to (MWP). Similarly (41), (42) and y 0 show that (x,ȳ) is feasible to (MWD). Hence we obtain the theorem. 2 Theorem 3.3. Let ȳ) is a feasible solution to both (MWP) and (MWD) with the two objective functions having equal values. If also weak duality holds between (MWP) and (MWD), then (x,ȳ) is optimal for both problems.
Proof. Because (P 0 , Q 0 ) is an equilibrium point for M 1 (x,ȳ) and P 0T M 1 (x,ȳ)Q 0 = 0 we obtain M 1 (x,ȳ)Q 0 0 and P 0T M 1 (x,ȳ) 0, i.e.,
Sincex Proof. We have
It follows from the hypothesesȳ
is an equilibrium point for the matrix game M 1 (x,ȳ) and the value of this game is zero. 2
Symmetric fractional duality and matrix game
Consider the following pair of symmetric fractional programs [2] :
Here F and G are twice differentiate functions from R n × R m to R, F (·, y) and G(x, ·) are convex, F (x, ·) and G(·, y) are concave. It is further assumed throughout that in the feasible regions defined by the above inequalities, G > 0 and F 0. Let us now define the (n + m + 1) × (n + m + 1) skew symmetric matrix B 2 (x, y) as follows: 
